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The proposed TRC
The proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that the four
main political forces settled on prior to the formation of the Chief
Justice-led government has, predicatively, run into heavy weather. The
‘new and improved’ TRC was agreed in a package deal on new government
formation without much consultation with conflict victims and the human
rights community. It was highly unlikely that conflict victims who have
had to wait for justice for years on end would agree to a mechanism
settled within four walls among an extremely limited number of relevant
actors. Now it appears that the diplomatic missions in Kathmandu,
particularly the Europeans, are unconvinced about the proposed TRC as
well, and seem all set to pile on pressure for vital amendments. In
their reckoning, the proposed TRC falls woefully short of meeting
Nepal’s international obligations.
Such a backlash was inevitable given the opacity of the political deal
that finalized the TRC ordinance. The ambiguous language of the
ordinance has only added fuel to the fire. Section 2 of the ordinance
outlines nine kinds of serious human rights violations, but there is no
section in the whole ordinance that makes the perpetrators of crimes
listed under Section 2 culpable. Likewise, the commission has been asked
to work under the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, instead of
making it directly answerable to the government, putting a big question
mark over its independence.
But the most disconcerting aspect of the TRC ordinance comprise sections
22 to 29, which in a roundabout language provisions for general amnesty
even to those involved in serious human rights violations during the
conflict. For instance, it is feared that the commission’s prerogative
to grant amnesty “on the basis of sufficient reasons” could be easily
abused to protect rights violators with strong political connections.
Granting justice to conflict victims is an important part of the peace
process and should be dealt with the seriousness it deserves.
Intentional or not, it was a big mistake of the Big Four to push through
the TRC ordinance without even consulting the relevant stakeholders.
They seem to have forgotten that who gets to lead the new government can
be a matter of political give and take, but the question of justice for
thousands of victims of grave rights violations is not something that
can be settled on their diktat. There is a fear that a sufficiently
empowered TRC could push the country into another conflict by opening up
old wounds. Yes, retribution should never be the TRC’s goal, and great
care must be taken not to make it a tool to settle political scores.
But it is inconceivable that the TRC can be formalized without adequate
consultations with those it meant for. In fact, if the TRC is seen as
inherently flawed, conflict victims are likely to take matters into
their own hands—as has been recently happening in the case of Balkrishna
Dhungel, the former Maoist lawmaker who has been convicted of murder by
the Supreme Court. This goes to show that if the victims do not get a
say in the matter, the whole purpose of the transitional justice
mechanisms will be defeated
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